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rule and once the interpretative and administrative problems are resolved,
the goals of certainty, judicial economy and preservation of an accused's
78
rights will certainly be enhanced.
Carol J. Young

ANTITRUST - TREBLE-DAMAGE ACTION - Hanover Shoe Inc. RULE BARS
OFFENSIVE

USE OF PASSING-ON DOCTRINE BY INDIRECT PURCHASER.

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (U.S. 1977)
The State of Illinois and seven hundred local government units in the
Greater Chicago area brought suit in the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois' under section 4 of the Clayton Act (section 4),2 against
eleven manufacturers and distributors of concrete block in the Greater
Chicago area, alleging a combination and conspiracy to fix the price of
concrete block in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 Plaintiffs
78. See notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the police
will adjust to Davenportin the same manner that police eventually adjusted to the per
se rules in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although the requirements of
Miranda - providing notice to an accused of his right to remain silent and be
represented by counsel - were practically easier to comply with, there was a concern

among law enforcement officials that Miranda would seriously inhibit a defendant
from confessing. These fears eventually subsided, as, it is submitted, shall the similar
concerns about the feasibility of implementing Davenport. For studies on the actual
impact of Miranda on police interrogation, see generally Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander,
Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement
Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); Robinson, Police and ProsecutorPracticesand
Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Re-Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda
Questionnaires:A Constructof Police Capacity to Comply, 1968 DUKE L. J. 425 (1968);
Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1 (1967); Witt, supra note 60; Younger, Interrogationof CriminalDefendants Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 255 (1966); Comments,
supra note 49 at 1519. For a discussion of the practical problems associated with
application of Davenport rule, see notes 63-74 and accompanying text supra.
1. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4 provides in pertinent part: "Any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. States and local governmental bodies are
considered persons under § 4 when suing on their own injuries. Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).

3. 67 F.R.D. at 463. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides

in part: "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is
declared to be illegal .... " Id.
The instant action was brought after the United States had filed criminal and
civil proceedings against the same defendants. See Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536
F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976). A consent decree was entered in the civil suit, and a
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contended that the overcharge resulting from the defendants' price fixing
had been paid by masonry contractors who passed the overcharge on to
general contractors, who in turn, included it in their bids on plaintiffs'
construction projects.4
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that the indirect purchasers lacked standing to sue. 5 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.8 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari7 and reversed, holding that its decision in Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.8 barred a private treble-damage
action based on offensive use of the passing-on theory. 9 Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress intended to create a scheme
that allowed any injured party to recover. 10 The Supreme Court has
interpreted these laws broadly to effectuate what it perceived as the dual
congressional purposes of deterrence and compensation through effective
private enforcement." Until recently, the Court reasoned that the statutes
plea of nolo contendre in the criminal action. See id. Suit was also filed by masonry
and general contractors but that suit was settled without prejudice to the plaintiffs'
recovery in the instant case. See id.
4. 67 F.R.D. at 463. Plaintiffs alleged that the amount of their injuries as a result
of the overcharge and passing-on practices exceeded three million dollars. Id. For a
discussion of the passing-on doctrine, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra.
5. 67 F.R.D. at 468. Although granting summary judgment for the defendant, the
district court rejected as the basis for summary judgment the defendants' contention
that indirect purchasers were barred, as a matter of law, from bringing suit by the
Supreme Court's decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481 (1968). 67 F.R.D. at 466. See notes 22-30 and accompanying text infra.
6. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976). The Seventh
Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to sue and rejected defendants' argument
that the suit was barred as a matter of law. Id. at 1164-67.
7. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 429 U.S. 938 (1977).
8. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). For a discussion of the Hanover Shoe decision, see notes
21-29 and accompanying text infra.
9. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Justice Brennan was joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun in his dissent and Justice Blackmun also wrote a
separate dissenting opinion. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977),
rehearing denied, 98 S. Ct. 243 (1977).
10. Section 4 provides that any injured party may sue and recover damages,
regardless of the amount in controversy. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). For the text of this
section, see note 2 supra. This provision suggests that Congress intended a remedy
irrespective of the degree of injury. See also 21 CONG. REc. 2612, 3148, 3149 (1890)
(remarks of Sen. Sherman). Further, by allowing a plaintiff to use a judgment
obtained by the Government as prima facie evidence of a violation, Congress made it
possible for a plaintiff to establish an injury without fully litigating liability. Clayton
Act, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
The Sherman Act, as enforced through the Clayton Act, was "conceived
primarily as a remedy for '[t]he people of the United States as individuals,' especially
for consumers." 431 U.S. at 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). As noted
by the Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1970), private antitrust actions "were conceived primarily as 'openling] the door of
justice to everyman, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust
laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.'" Id. at
486 n.10, quoting 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb).
11. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In Northern
Pacific, the Supreme Court noted that the Sherman Act was designed to be a
"comprehensive charter of economic liberty." Id. The Court in Minnesota Mining &
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were "best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever present
threat," thereby deterring violations. 12 In order to promote deterrence
through the vigilance of private parties, the Court has directed that courts
"not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is
..",13
". It was also recognized by the
specifically set forth by Congress
Court that section 4 "does not confine its protection to consumers, or to
purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers . .

.

.[It] is comprehensive in its

terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden
practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."'1 4 To facilitate enforcement
of the antitrust laws, Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976.15 One section of this legislation authorizes state
attorneys general to sue as parens patriae on behalf of state citizens. 16 This
provision was adopted in order to establish "an effective mechanism to
Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1964), stated that the

antitrust laws intended to "use private self-interest as a means of enforcement. The
[law] was intended to help persons of small means who are injured in their property or
business." Id. at 318-19 (citations omitted). In recognition of its paramount
enforcement role, the Supreme Court determined that the private action was not to be
burdened. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969).
In Perkins v. Standard Oil of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), the Supreme Court cautioned
against a narrow reading of § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), since the defendant might thereby avoid the
sanctions of the statute. 395 U.S. at 647.
12. Perma-Life v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
13. Radovich v. N.F.L., 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957). The Court reemphasized this
position in Radiant Burner, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(per curiam), where it was noted that "'Congress [has] determined its own criteria of
public harm and it [is] not for the courts to decide whether in an individual case injury
[has] actually occurred."' Id. at 660, quoting Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359
U.S. 207, 211 (1959). The Court has also frequently stated that uncertainty of proof,
especially in antitrust treble-damage actions, should not bar recovery. See, e.g.,
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 256 (1946). In Bigelow the Court
remarked that "[tihe 'constant tendency of the courts is to find some way in which
damages can be awarded when a wrong has been done.'" Id. at 266, quoting Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 556 (1931).
In outlining the plaintiffs burden of proof in antitrust suits, it has been
suggested that
[u]nder Section 4, plaintiff must show not only that the defendant violated
the antitrust laws but that his conduct caused the damages alleged in the
complaint. Normally it would be enough with respect to causation if the
defendant "materially contributed" to the plaintiffs injury or "substantially
contributed, notwithstanding other factors contributed also." The plaintiff need
not show that the illegality was a more substantial cause than any other.
Perma-Life v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
14. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948) (citations omitted). While the courts have not lost sight of the compensatory
goal of the antitrust laws, they have employed various criteria to determine who is a
sufficiently injured party to bring suit. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
15.'Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
16. Id. § 301, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976)). The
parens patriae provision reads in pertinent part:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of such
State as parenspatriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State ...to
secure monetary relief ...for injuries sustained by such natural persons to their
property by reason of any violation .... The court shall exclude from the
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permit consumers to recover damages by giving state attorneys general a
' 17
cause of action against antitrust violators.
The passing-on doctrine has been asserted as a method of proof in
private antitrust actions. A party seeking to establish its applicability would
attempt to trace the effects of an illegal overcharge through the various
levels of a product's chain of distribution.' 8 The passing-on doctrine is used
defensively to show that the claimants, usually direct purchasers, were not
in fact injured by the overcharge since they were able to pass the added cost
on to the next purchaser. 19 The doctrine is invoked offensively by claimants
who are indirect purchasers to prove that they were in fact injured and
20
therefore entitled to recover under section 4.
In Hanover Shoe, 2 ' the Supreme Court ruled that passing-on could not
be asserted as a defense to an antitrust action brought by a direct

amount of monetary relief awarded in such action any amount of monetary relief
...which duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the same in-jury
Id.
17. S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976). The parens patriae method of
litigation was designed to ensure that ultimate consumers would be able to recover for
their injuries without being precluded by concepts of "standing, privity, target area,
remoteness and the like." Id. at 42. The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick interpreted the
Parens Patriae legislation as merely establishing a new procedural device to enforce
§ 4 remedies, rather than as creating a substantive right of recovery. 431 U.S. at
733-34 n.14. For a discussion of this point see notes 52 and 108 and accompanying
text infra.
18. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1968). The use of this doctrine usually arises in the area of overcharge violations.
Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 347 (1974). It
may also arise in price discrimination cases. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
19. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1968). For a concise discussion of the defensive use of the passing-on concept, see
Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe
Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1184-91 (1968). The defensive use of this doctrine
was proscribed by the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe. 392 U.S. at 494. For a
discussion of Hanover Shoe, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text infra.
20. Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-on
Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 98, 101 (1972).
21. Hanover Shoe, a lessee of shoe making equipment, alleged that United, in
refusing to sell the equipment, had violated the antitrust laws. 392 U.S. at 483. The
primary issue was whether the district court had erred in precluding United from
asserting passing-on as a defense. Id. at 487-88. United argued that Hanover was not
injured because any illegally high rental price it had paid to United had been passedon to Hanover's customers in the form of higher shoe costs. Id. at 491-92. The district
court ruled that this defense was impermissible because Hanover was the ultimate
consumer of the machinery and had suffered a legal injury. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa. 1960). On interlocutory
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), the district court's ruling was affirmed.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 901 (1960). United preserved the issue and presented it again after losing on
the merits, but the Third Circuit affirmed. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 377 F.2d 776, 781 (3d Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 389 U.S. 818 (1967). For a discussion
of the Supreme Court's decision, see notes 22-29 and accompanying text infra.
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purchaser, 22 except in limited circumstances.2 3 This decision was based on
what the Court perceived to be insurmountable difficulties of proof,2 4 the
resulting need for complex multiparty litigation, 25 and the consequent
diminished effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement.2 6 The Court
further reasoned that the compensatory aim of the antitrust laws would be
circumvented if the direct purchaser could not allege an injury. 27 The Court
concluded that the plaintiff in Hanover Shoe could establish a prima facie
case, demonstrating a legally cognizable injury, if it showed that it paid an

22. 392 U.S. at 488.
23. Id. at 494. The Court stated:
We recognize that there might be situations - for instance, when an overcharged
buyer has a pre-existing "cost-plus" contract, thus making it easier to prove that
he has not been damaged - where the considerations requiring that the passingon defense not be permitted in this case would not be present.
Id. For a discussion of this limitation, see Beane, supra note 18, at 343-44.
24. 392 U.S. at 492. The Court noted that if the defense were allowed, defendants
in every case would seek to show that the plaintiff had not been injured under the
prevailing economic circumstances. Id. However, the Court considered this method of
proof to be very tenuous, stating that it was extremely difficult in the "real economic
world" to establish the precise effects of an illegal overcharge by a supplier on the
final price. Id. at 493. Not only did the Court consider the task insurmountable, but it
was also concerned with the burdens that would be placed on the judicial system if
defendants were permitted to raise the passing-on defense. Id.; see Note, supra note 20,
at 105. This concern stemmed from the Court's recognition that the use of the passingon doctrine would place each factor affecting a pricing decision in issue. 392 U.S. at
493. For example, the Hanover Shoe Court noted that the mere fact that a direct
purchaser increased his selling price after a violation was committed by his supplier
could not be attributed to a passing-on practice until all other factors affecting the
pricing decision of the direct purchaser were considered. Id. at 493 n.9.
25. Id. at 494. The Court noted that the use of the passing-on defense would
require that each buyer in the chain of distribution, except the ultimate consumer,
refute the defense in order to establish a right to recover. Id.
26. Id. The Court noted that the ultimate consumer, who alone as plaintiff would
be immune to the assertion of the defense, would have little incentive to sue because of
the small stake involved. Id. Thus, the violators would "retain the fruits of their
illegality." Id. The effectiveness of the treble-damage action as a deterrent would
thereby be impaired. Id. Given the importance of private enforcement of the antitrust
laws, the Court feared that increased procedural complexity in antitrust litigation
would ultimately reduce the number and efficacy of such suits. Id. See notes 88-93
and accompanying text infra.
27. 392 U.S. at 494. The Court noted that if a buyer absorbs the loss he is entitled
to damages. Id. If, in the face of an overcharge, he maintains his price but adjusts
volume or costs to maintain his profit margin, the Court reasoned that he could still
recover. Id. Even if the buyer raises his prices, the Court stated that he would also be
entitled to recover because his injury is complete at the time he pays the illegal
overcharge. Id., citing Chattanoga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390,
396 (1906); Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533 (1918). The
cases cited by the Hanover Shoe Court have been construed as holding that liability is
established when the party in privity to the defendant suffers the loss. See Note, supra
note 20, at 104. Moreover, the Court dismissed as dicta the alternate holding of Keogh
v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1922), that despite liability being
established when a plaintiff pays an illegally high price, his recovery of damages is
conditioned on proof that another has not suffered the loss. 392 U.S. at 491 n.8. For a
criticism of this treatment of the alternate Keogh holding, see Pollock, supra note 19,
at 1193 n.26 (alternate ground constitutes a separate holding).
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illegally high price, and also showed the amount of the overcharge,2 8
29
regardless of the subsequent mitigation achieved by passing it on.
Although Hanover Shoe considered only the defensive use of the
passing-on doctrine, the precedent it established had obvious bearing on the
offensive use of passing on. Since the defendant could no longer contend
that the direct purchaser had passed-on the overcharge, the question
whether any injured party besides the direct purchaser could sue was soon
30
raised.
In Mangano v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,3 ' the
Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal3 2 of a complaint filed by
indirect purchasers of goods that were alleged to have been overpriced
34
33
because of price fixing. Although the issue did not need to be addressed,
the district court had ruled that offensive use of the passing-on doctrine was
barred by the concern with insurmountable difficulties of proof expressed in
Hanover Shoe35 and by the tenuous economic connection between the initial
overcharge and the remote purchasers. 36 The court also stated that the

28. 392 U.S. at 494.
29. Id. at 489. At least one court considering the offensive use of passing-on
interpreted Hanover Shoe to impart an element of privity into the right to sue on an
antitrust violation. Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 637 (D. Colo. 1971).
However, it should be noted that Hanover Shoe did not mention, much less overrule,
cases that had already held that privity was not required for a plaintiff to establish
standing in an antitrust action. See, e.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers v.
Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 419 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v.Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564, 566 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 834 (1963); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Co., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955).
30. The confusion concerning offensive use of passing-on resulted in part because
of Hanover Shoe's reliance on cases requiring privity. See notes 27 & 29 supra.
Additionally, at least one court feared that multiple liability would result if, after the
direct purchaser recovered the full overcharge, subsequent purchasers sued and
recovered their damages. Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971) (per
curiam). For a discussion of Mangano, see notes 31-41 and accompanying text infra.
31. 438 F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971) (per curiam) aff'g Philadelphia Housing Auth. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
32. Phildelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
33. 438 F.2d at 1188. The Third Circuit noted that the plaintiffs were purchasers
of homes containing illegally overpriced plumbing fixtures, but that they were not the
first consumers in the chain of distribution. Id. The first consumer, the builder, was in
much the same position as Hanover. Id. See note 21 supra.
34. The district court's dismissal of the action resulted from the plaintiffs' failure
to answer interrogatories. 50 F.R.D. at 18.
35. Id. at 26. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's concern with difficulties of
proof in Hanover Shoe, see note 24 and accompanying text supra.
36. 50 F.R.D. at 29. The court construed the issue facing it, to be whether or not an
injury could be demonstrated, and concluded that none could be shown because the
claims were too remote. Id. at 31. Determining that Hanover Shoe rested primarily on
the difficulty of proving an economic connection, the district court rejected the
proposition that Hanover Shoe also rested on the need for vigilant enforcement of the
antitrust laws. Id. at 29. For a discussion of the concern in Hanover Shoe with
enforcement through private suits, see note 26 and accompanying text supra.See also,
Rodos & McMahon, Standing to Sue of Subsequent Purchasers, 20 S.D.L. REV. 107,
116 n.56 (1975).
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Hanover Shoe precedent mandated dismissal because offensive use of
passing-on would be accompanied by the potential for double recovery of
treble damages.3 7 The Third Circuit agreed that the difficulties of proof
precluded the plaintiffs from demonstrating that any overcharge by the
manufacturer was "a causa sine qua non of any payment any of them had
to make." 38 Mangano, which some commentators interpreted as imposing a
privity requirement for standing to sue in an antitrust action, 39 was followed
41
in a number of district courts, 0 but by no other circuit court.
In in re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,42 the Ninth Circuit championed
the view that Hanover Shoe did not bar offensive use of passing-on. 43 In
Liquid Asphalt, the court concluded that the Supreme Court in Hanover
Shoe was more concerned with promoting the effective enforcement of the antitrust law through private treble damages actions, than with the difficulties of proof.4" The court reasoned that if indirect purchasers were not allowed to

37. 50 F.R.D. at 30. The district court stated that unless the Supreme Court in
Hanover Shoe "intended to state a rule permitting double (treble-) [sic] recovery of the
same loss, which this court cannot believe, such a position must preclude recovery
. ... " Id. The district court gave little weight to the distinction that in Hanover Shoe
no other plaintiff was available to bring suit. Id. at 29. This fact alone might justify
allowing one plaintiff to be overcompensated in order to foster the deterence objective
of private antitrust litigation. See text accompanying note 88 infra. Further, it
appears that the district court's concern with multiple liability was unwarranted since
district courts have various procedural tools at their disposal with which they may
deal with the problem. See notes 49 & 102-104 and accompanying text infra.
In addition, although plaintiffs argued that exceptions should be available
that allowed them to utilize passing-on to prove their case, the district court felt that
Hanover Shoe would only allow a single exception - a preexisting cost-plus contract
- to the bar of offensive and defensive use of passing-on. 50 F.R.D. at 30.
38. 438 F.2d at 1188.
39. This interpretation resulted from the district court's conclusion that the
plaintiffs' claims were too remote. 50 F.R.D. at 31. See Comment, Mangano and
Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Shoe Doctrine,72 COLUM.
L. REV. 394, 410 n.95 (1972). But see, Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the
Consumer Interest; The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 85
YALE L.J. 626, 644-45 (1975). For an interpretation of the privity requirement, see
Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971).
40. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); City of Akron v. Laub Baking Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,930 (N.D.
Ohio 1972); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 637-38 (D. Colo. 1971).
41. See, e.g., Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976); In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 n.6 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
42. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
43. 487 F.2d at 201.
44. Id. at 196. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the policy of promoting
enforcement favored allowing plaintiffs to demonstrate injury. Id. at 197. Permitting
indirect purchasers to sue, it was believed, would contribute to the goal of fewer
antitrust violations. Id. at 199.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit determined that the issue of difficulty of proof
raised in Hanover Shoe should not be used to foreclose recovery by an injured plaintiff
particularly since the issue was raised in Hanover Shoe as a means of aiding the
plaintiff in establishing liability. Id. at 196 n.5, 199. The court noted that complexity
of proof problems could arise in one of three areas: 1) establishing liability; 2)
measuring damages; and 3) determining standing. Id. at 197 n.5. The court
specifically rejected the notion that complexity of proof "would foreclose recovery on
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sue, the compensatory aim of antitrust legislation would be frustrated, 45 and
in most cases the violator would retain the fruits of his illegality because
direct purchasers would not sue.16 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that Hanover Shoe could not have intended to foreclose proof of illegallity or
proof of damages by an indirect purchaser. 47 The Ninth Circuit thus rejected
the use of a privity test as a means of determining standing and imposed
instead the target-area test.48 The court also noted that even though it was
not an issue in the case before it, federal courts were well equipped to
prevent multiple liability. 49 To resolve the conflict among the circuits that
had arisen after the Hanover Shoe decision concerning the offensive use of
the passing-on theory, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Illinois
50
Brick.
The Illinois Brick Court began its analysis with the premise that
symmetry should be required in determining the fate of the passing-on
doctrine; therefore it concluded that whatever rule was adopted, it had to be
equally applicable to plaintiffs and defendants.5 1 As a result of its decision
the grounds of difficulty of trial." Id. As the court remarked: "It has never been
thought that an antitrust violation was irremediable because done on a grand scale."
Id. The Ninth Circuit felt that in Hanover Shoe the Supreme Court was concerned
with aiding the first purchaser in establishing liability, but not primarily concerned
with the amount of damages. Id. The court concluded that the issue facing it was one
of standing, which could be determined as a matter of law, rather than of causation or
damages, both of which are questions for the jury. Id. at 199, citing Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49 (1969).
45. 487 F.2d at 196. The court stated that the underlying rationale of Hanover
Shoe was to "preserve the antitrust suit and to promote compensation to those
injured." Id.
46. Id. at 198. The court noted that most direct purchasers do not bring suit. Id. In
Liquid Asphalt only four contractors brought suit despite the fact that the conspiracy
extended over seven states and affected a large number of people. Id. Direct
purchasers did not sue for a number of reasons, the most important being their need
to maintain good relationships with their suppliers. Id.
47. Id. at 200. The court determined that the rule of Hanover Shoe did not
establish a per se rule barring defensive use of passing-on, but rather should be
viewed in light of its specific facts. Id. at 199. Under the interpretation, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Hanover Shoe would aid antitrust enforcement and not exclude
injured parties from court based on the remote possibility of multiply liability. Id.
48. Id. at 199. The target-area test treats an antitrust violation as a shot aimed at
particular segment (e.g., petroleum-based products) of the economy - the target. Any
injured party within that segment of the economy could bring suit. Karseal Corp. v.
Richfield Oil Co., 221 F.2d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1955).
49. 487 F.2d at 201. The Ninth Circuit recommended the consolidation of cases
and the appointment of special masters in difficult cases as methods to avoid
imposing multiple liability on the antitrust violator. For an example of consolidated
proceedings by direct and indirect purchasers, see West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971). Moreover, the Liquid Asphalt court noted that defendants
could interplead all parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). 487 F.2d at 201. Further, the
four year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976), coupled with the protracted
nature of antitrust litigation, would prevent anyone from bringing suit after another
plaintiff obtained a judgment. 487 F.2d at 201. Inconsistent adjudications could be
prevented by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Id. For a discussion
of the practical aspects of the multiple liability problem, see text accompanying notes
75 & 102-104 infra.
50. 429 U.S. 938 (1977).
51. 431 U.S. at 729-36. The Court considered symmetry to be essential for two
reasons. First, the Court concluded that permitting offensive but not defensive use of
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to impose symmetrical rules on the offensive and defensive use of passingon, the Court perceived that its prior holding in Hanover Shoe had to be
52
considered in the disposition of the instant case.
In reappraising the viability of the passing-on theory, the Court
determined that its use in private treble damage actions would inject "new
dimensions of complexity" into such suits. 53 The Court foresaw that passingon would cause conflicting claims to be asserted, 54 which would require
either compulsory joinder or interpleading of all potential plaintiffs in one
action. 55 Such a requirement, the Court concluded, would unnecessarily
complicate private antitrust actions. 56 Further, as in Hanover Shoe, the
the passing-on doctrine would impose a serious risk of multiple liability on defendants
because such an uneven application of the doctrine would "presum[e] that one
plaintiff [the direct purchaser] is entitled to full recovery while preventing the
defendant from using that presumption against the other plaintiff [the indirect
purchaser]." Id. at 730 (emphasis in original). Second, the Court determined that the
difficulties of proof recognized by the Hanover Shoe Court were inherent in any use of
passing-on - defensive or offensive. As the Court noted:
However "long and complicated" the proceedings would be when defendants
sought to prove pass-on ... , they would be equally so when the same evidence
was introduced by plaintiffs. Indeed the evidentiary complexities and uncertainties involved in the defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are
multipled in the offensive use of a pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed
from the defendant in the chain of distribution. The demonstration of how much
of the overcharge was passed on by the first purchaser must be repeated at each
point at which the price-fixed goods changed hands before they reached the
plaintiff.
Id. at 732-33 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Court's symmetry
requirements see notes 72 & 95-98 and accompanying text infra.
52. 431 U.S. at 736. The Court stated that "either we must overrule Hanover Shoe
(or at least narrowly confine it to its facts), or we must preclude respondents from
seeking to recover on their pass-on theory." Id.
The Court commenced its discussion of the precendent established by
Hanover Shoe by considering the stare decisis effect of that decision. Id. Noting that
the principle of stare decisis weighs heavily "in the area of statutory construction
where Congress is free to change [the] Court's interpretation of legislation," the Court
concluded that stare decisis alone would support reaffirmance of Hanover Shoe. Id. at
736-37 (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not consider the
enactment of the Parens Patriae legislation to have any bearing on congressional
intent since it merely creates a procedure for recovery rather than establishing any
substantive rights. Id. at 733-34 n.14. For a discussion of the Parens Patriae
legislation, see notes 15-17 and accmpanying text supra.
53. 431 U.S. at 737.
54. Id. The Court stated that the use of passing-on would enable plaintiffs at each
level in the chain of distribution to claim that the illegal overcharge had been totally
absorbed at their level in the chain. Id. Thus, the courts could be faced with
conflicting claims of total absorption of the overcharge by each purchaser in a chain
of distribution. Id.
55. Id. at 736-37. The Court viewed the inclusion of all potential plaintiffs in one
action as very unrealistic. Id. at 738. The Court reasoned that the need for multiple
party litigation would compel plaintiffs to deal with all the procedural problems
inherent in joinder and class actions. Id. at 737-38. Moreover, the Court noted that in
practice not all parties could be joined and that the courts would be faced with large
classes of plaintiffs and defendants, involving different and conflicting interests, and
many levels of distribution. Id. at 739-40.
56. Id. at 741. The Court stated: "We are no more inclined than we were in
Hanover Shoe to ignore the burdens that such an attempt to trace the effects of the
overcharge through each level in a chain of distribution would impose on the effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws." Id.
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Illinois Brick Court was concerned that the use of the passing-on doctrine
would burden the treble-damage action with "massive evidence and
complicated theories. '57 The Court determined that the use of economic
models would not be sufficient 58 to resolve the passing-on issues that could
be raised. 59 Faced with the complexity of proof and multiparty litigation
that would accompany the use of passing-on, the Court concluded that the
doctrine would unjustifiably diminish the effectiveness of private treble60
damage actions.
In the Court's view, the importance of avoiding procedural and
substantive complexity in treble-damage actions lay in the need to preserve
the incentive for private parties to undertake such suits.6' If the use of the
passing-on doctrine were authorized, the stake for each party after
apportionment of damages would be too small to make litigation economically feasible, 62 and the amount recovered would bear little relation to the
actual injury. 63 Thus, the Court concluded that the assertion of the passingon doctrine could erode the use of private treble-damage actions as a means
of deterring antitrust violations.6 4 While conceding that a direct purchaser
might not be willing to sue, 65 the Court determined that until Congress
clearly indicated otherwise, private enforcement and the legislative purpose
in establishing an army of private attorneys general would be better served
by permitting direct purchasers to recover the full amount of the

57. Id., quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493
(1968).
58. 431 U.S. at 741-42. In concluding that economic studies would not alleviate
the problems of complicated proof posed by the use of the passing-on doctrine, the
Court noted that courts have encountered difficulties when dealing with sophisticated
economic models. Id. at 742, citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court,
relying on Hanover Shoe, also noted that hypothetical economic models were not
determinative of real world conditions. 431 U.S. at 742, citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968).
59. 431 U.S. at 742. If the passing-on doctrine were an element in private antitrust
actions, the Court stated that the relevant market conditions would have to be
ascertained, the amount of the overcharge would have to be allocated to each level in
the chain of distribution, and the damages for lost profits would have to be quantified.
Id. at 743 n.27.
60. Id. at 742. The Court recognized that there were at least three situations in
which the complexities of proof and multiparty litigation would not be a substantial
barrier to proving injury: 1) when goods are resold without being altered; 2) when
middlemen use a fixed percentage markup in pricing; and 3) where the item is a small
but vital component of a larger product, causing demand to be highly inelastic for the
price-fixed item. Id. at 743-44. However, the Court refused to establish these situations
as exceptions to the Hanover Shoe rule. Id. at 744. The Court determined that carving
out exceptions would entail the very problems that prompted the Hanover Shoe Court
to bar the defensive use of passing-on. Id. at 744-45. Therefore, the Court concluded
that Hanover Shoe implicitly rejected the creation of exceptions other than the
enumerated situation of a preexisting cost-plus contract. Id. at 745.
61. Id. at 745-46.
62. Id. at 746-47.
63. Id.at 747.
64. Id. at 746. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
65. 431 U.S. at 748. The Court acknowledged that "direct purchasers sometimes
may refrain from bringing a treble-damage suit for fear of disrupting relations with
their suppliers." Id. (citations omitted).
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overcharge. 68 Although refusing to extend the compensatory goal of the
antitrust laws to its "logical extreme" 67 the Court did state that barring the
use of the passing-on doctrine furthered the compensatory goal "to the
extent that the direct purchaser absorbs some and often most of the
overcharge. '68 Thus, the Court held that the goals of compensation and
deterrence both would be furthered by applying the Hanover Shoe rule to the
69
offensive use of p assing-on.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated that privity was a justifiable
reason for denying the defensive use of the passing-on doctrine since
otherwise the wrongdoer would be able to escape liability. 70 He pointed out,
71
however, that privity was not required to establish a right to recover.
Justice Brennan then rejected the majority's symmetrical treatment of the
passing-on doctrine, asserting that different policy considerations supported
its offensive use.7 2 Although recognizing the difficulties of proof and the
complicated trial proceedings inherent in either use of passing-on, the
dissent noted that every antitrust case involves intricate proof of what
would have happened absent the violation.7 3 Justice Brennan maintained
further that regardless of which standing test is used - the direct injuryprivity test or the more liberal target-area test - recovery should at least
extend to all potential plaintiffs within the defendants' chain of distribution
in order to preserve the thrust of section 4.74 The dissent concluded with the
66. Id.

67. Id. The Court admitted that it was unwilling to attempt "to allocate damages

among all 'those within the defendant's chain of distribution,'" and recognized that,
as a result, some indirect purchasers who "have actually been injured by antitrust
violations" may be denied recovery. Id. at 746-47.
68. d.at 746.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 9 supra.
71. Id. In noting that privity was not required, Justice Brennan remarked that:
A plaintiff seeking to recover damages need only show a causal connection
between the price discrimination in violation of the [antitrust laws] and the
injury suffered ....

If there is suffificent evidence in the record to support an

inference of causation, the ultimate conclusion as to what the evidence proves is
for the jury.
Id., quoting Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969).
72. 431 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan expressed concern
over the possible frustration of major policy objectives established by Congress in
enacting the antitrust laws and providing for private enforcement. Id. at 754-58
(Brennan J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that allowing offensive use, without
allowing defensive use, would insure "the continued effectiveness of the treble-damage
action and [prevent] wrongdoers from retaining the spoils of their misdeeds," while
denying defensive use would prevent defendants from escaping liability. Id. at 753
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Brennan interpreted the recently enacted
Parens Patriae legislation as reinforcing the policy considerations favoring suits by
indirect purchasers utilizing passing-on concepts to establish injury. Id. at 756-58
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
73. 431 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized that
the difficulty of tracing an economic consequence and the use of "reasoned
estimation" is present in all cases, not just those involving passing-on. Id. at 758-59
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 760-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It was pointed out that these standing
tests had been developed in recognition of the limits on recovery under § 4. Id.at 760
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 6

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23

observation that although problems of multiple liability were theoretically
possible, such considerations were not sufficiently pressing in practice to
75
justify barring recovery.
Given the goals of the antitrust laws and the favorable position occupied
by antitrust plaintiffs, 76 it is suggested that Illinois Brick is open to criticism
77
in the following areas: 1) its extension of Hanover Shoe; 2) its insistence on
7
symmetry; 3) its failure to consider the practical aspects of the multiple
liability problem; 79 and 4) its views of congressional intent and the statutory
purposes to be furthered.80
It is submitted that the Court, in its refusal to limit Hanover Shoe,8s has
added an unjustified privity requirement to antitrust treble-damage
actions.8 2 Although Hanover Shoe relied upon prior Supreme Court cases to
support the theory that liability is complete at the time the direct purchaser
suffers a loss,8 3 it can be argued that this theory does not mean that the

amount of the direct purchaser's damages could not be mitigated by a
passing-on practice. 84 Prior to Illinois Brick, the privity requirement was
expressly rejected in favor of only requiring the plaintiff to establish
causation. 5 By applying the Hanover Shoe rule to offensive use of the
passing-on doctrine, 86 the Court appears to have acted in contradiction to its

75. Id. at 761-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in a separate
dissent, noted that if Hanover Shoe were not "on the books," the Court would have
probably unanimously rejected defendants' argument. Id. at 765 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun expressed his regret that because of the Hanover Shoe
decision Congress will have to enact new legislation in order to achieve "the obvious
congressional aim." Id. at 766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 83-93 and accompanying text infra.
78. See notes 94-98 and accompanying text infra.

79. See notes 101-104 and accompanying text infra.
80. See notes 99-100 & 105-109 and accompanying text infra.
81. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
82. See note 72 and accompanying text supra. One court, considering the
applicability of the Hanover Shoe rule to the offensive use of the passing-on doctrine,
noted:
The attempt to transform a rejection of a defense because it unduly hampers
antitrust enforcement into a reason for a complete refusal to entertain the claims
of a certain class of plaintiffs seems an ingenious attempt to turn the decision [in
Hanover Shoe] and its underlying rationale on its head.
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680 at 94, 978-79
(D. Conn. 1973).
83. See notes 27-29 supra.
84. See note 27 supra.
85. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969).
86. Confronted with the choice in Illinois Brick of either denying the indirect
purchasers recovery or imposing partial liability on the defendants, the Court failed to
distinguish the situation presented in Hanover Shoe where either the direct purchaser
would have been overcompensated or the defendants would have escaped liability. 431
U.S. at 752 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This distinction between the two cases could
have supported a rule contrary to Hanover Shoe for the offensive use of passing-on.
Another significant distinction that could have been noted was that, unlike in
Hanover Shoe, multiple liability would not have occurred in the instant case since the
suits by the direct purchasers were settled without prejudice to recovery in the instant
case. See note 3 supra.
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earlier determination that the antitrust laws are designed to protect all
victims. 87

It is further submitted that the Court failed to consider the importance
of the role of the treble-damage action and the special features of section 4
that are designed to facilitate suits by plaintiffs with small economic
stakes.8 8 At least one court 8 9 and commentator 90 believe that the overriding
concern in Hanover Shoe was to preserve the effectiveness of the private
treble-damage action. 91 Although Illinois Brick purportedly seeks to
strengthen such actions, 92 it must be noted that there is no guarantee that
direct purchasers will be any more willing to sue now than they were in the
past. This continued unwillingness may result in a situation in which no one
provides the vigorous enforcement sought by Congress. 93
The Court's requirement of symmetry - imposing the same rule on
defensive and offensive use of the doctrine - seemed to stem primarily from
the Court's concern with the burdens placed on the judicial system.9 4 It is
conceded that the same difficulties of proof are encountered in defensive or
offensive use; 95 however, the interests sought to be furthered in each are
different. In his Illinois Brick dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the
Hanover Shoe Court was concerned that the defendant "would escape
liability and frustrate the objectives of the treble damage action." 96 In
considering offensive use, it is submitted that the policy of favoring private
enforcement and insuring its continued availability argues against
imposing burdens on the plaintiff.97 It appears that the Illinois Brick Court
has given greater emphasis to considerations of judicial efficiency than to
the compensatory or deterrence goals of antitrust enforcement. 98
87. See Mandeville Island Farms Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236 (1946). See note 13 supra. The Court conceded in Illinois Brick that the
indirect purchaser may in fact be injured. 431 U.S. at 746-47. See note 67 supra.
88. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra.
89. See, In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
90. See, Comment, supra note 39, at 408-09.
91. See notes 44 & 45 supra.
92. See notes 61-69 and accompanying text supra.
93. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). See also note 65 and accompanying text supra.
94. See 431 U.S. at 732. In the Court's view, Hanover Shoe applies equally to the
"costs to the judicial system" when plaintiffs attempt the difficult problems of proof.
Id., see Note, supra note 20, at 105.
95. It should be noted that the burden of demonstrating passing-on may be no
more difficult than the burdens facing the plaintiff in establishing an overcharge. See,
Pollack, supra note 19, at 1210. For example, in Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff had to
establish, in order to recover, the difference between the amount paid to lease the
machinery and the amount it would have paid if United had agreed to sell. Id.
96. 431 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 318, 319 (1964); Radovich v. N.F.L., 362 U.S. 445, 454 (1957). See note 86 supra.
98. The dissent in Illinois Brick argued that recovery was precluded by the
majority because of difficulty of proof. 431 U.S. at 758-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
addition to its concern with difficulty of proof, the Court attributes to Hanover Shoe
the magical quality of stare decisis, stating that this legal principle is so important
that the Illinois Brick decision would stand on that basis alone, until explicitly
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It is submitted that the Court further sacrified the compensatory goal of
the antitrust laws by creating a windfall for direct purchasers who do sue,
and depriving the admittedly injured party of even the opportunity to seek
compensation.9 9 Faced with clear evidence of the concern of Congress for
indirect purchasers, particularly consumers, 1 ° the Court's conclusion that
limited relief is sufficient is difficult to understand.
Although the Court's concern with the risks of multiple liability is
theoretically sound,' 0 ' as a practical matter, the occurrence of such jeopardy
is unlikely unless additional suits are filed after one class of plaintiffs has
obtained a judgment. 1 2 Given the four-year statute of limitations and the
slow progress of antitrust cases in the court system, such a subsequent suit
district
is highly unlikely. 0 3 Even if potential multiple liability arose, the
04
courts involved would be able to fashion appropriate solutions.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court negated the possibility that the
question before it was one of standing and stated that the issue involved
was the analytically distinct question of actual injury, it is submitted that
the issue was in reality standing. 0 5 Questions of injury are factual ones
requiring a decision in each individual case as to whether injury would in
fact be beyond proof. Unlike standing issues, questions of injury cannot be
resolved by any absolute exclusion of litigation on the issue. 0 6 Assuming
that this decision is truly a question of standing, the Court's disregard of
Congress's intent is more serious, since Congress, in enacting the Parens
Patriae legislation, specifically addressed the problem of claimants being
barred by issues of standing. 07
If Congress had contemplated that the rule of Hanover Shoe should
apply to offensive use of passing-on, the recent Parens Patriae legislation
would have little of the significance or effect that Congress intended it to
have. It is, as interpreted by the Court, procedural legislation, conferring no
new substantive rights on antitrust plaintiffs. 09 Yet, why would Congress
create a procedure enabling consumers, the ultimate indirect purchasers, to
recover, if, as held by Illinois Brick, such plaintiffs have no substantive
right to do so? As noted by Justice Brennan's dissent, there is abundant
authority for deference to this type of expression of congressional intent. 0 9
overruled by Congress. Id. at 733-34 & n.14. It should be noted, however, that until
the instant decision, Hanover Shoe had not been applied by the Supreme Court to bar
offensive use of the passing-on doctrine.
99. See 431 U.S. at 760-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
102. See 431 U.S. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
104. See 431 U.S. at 761-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also notes 49 & 75 supra.
105. 431 U.S. at 728 n.7.
106. See Handler & Blechman, supra note 39, at 645 n.95. See also note 44 supra.
107. See note 17 supra.
108. 431 U.S. at 733-34 n.14.
109. Id. at 765 n.24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As authority for the proposition that
the Court may look to subsequent legislation to determine congressional intent in
earlier enactments, Justice Brennan cited NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
275 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969); FHA v. The
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It is submitted that this decision provides creative price fixers with the
potential to circumvent the antitrust laws. If the violator only sells its pricefixed items to a controlled corporation, the violator can be assured that this
controlled direct purchaser will not bring suit. In this manner no direct
purchaser will be available to bring suit unless an exception is created to the
Illinois Brick rule. 110 It is further submitted that the Illinois Brick Court is
subject to criticism for pronouncing such a significant rule in the context of
a summary judgment motion; rules of this broad a scope more appropriately
emanate from a full development of the facts."'
The impact of Illinois Brick is potentially grave, since it precludes many
112
parties injured by antitrust violations from obtaining any judicial relief.
Even assuming congressional amendment of section 4,113 many antitrust
violators may escape liability unless the new law is given retroactive effect.
Further, this decision may be relied upon in other areas for the proposition
that plaintiffs who rely on economic tracing to establish a right to recover
should be barred by difficulties of proof. Illinois Brick cannot help but to
serve as a catalyst for future disagreements over the proper objectives and
functions of antitrust legislation and may create unnecessary tension
between Congress and the court over the deference courts should pay to
expressions of congressional policy.
Karen Lee Turner

Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958); United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 480
(1923); and New York & Norfolk R.R. v. Peninsular Exchange, 240 U.S. 34, 39 (1916).
431 U.S. at 765 n.24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. The Court stated that it might create an exception to the Hanover Shoe bar on
defensive use of passing-on if the defendant can show that the direct purchaser was
controlled by its customer. 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. Given the Court's concern with
symmetrical application of the passing-on doctrine, it is possible that an exception
will be created to prevent defendants from escaping liability by selling only to
controlled corporations,
111. See, In re Antibiotic Antitrust Litigation, 333 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
112. See, e.g., In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 248 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 9, 1977); Beckers v. International Snowmobile Industry Ass'n, No. 77-244 (D.
Minn. Nov. 23, 1977); In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 201A (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 23, 1977); Royal Printing Co. v. Kimverly-Clark Corp., No. 77-0225 SC (N.D.
Cal. July 22, 1977); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 727 (N.D. Ill.
July 15, 1977). The above cited cases dealt with the application of the instant decision
to pending antitrust litigation. In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 75 F.R.D.
727 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1977), the district court ruled that the class of plaintiffs in a
class action be redrawn to exclude indirect purchasers. Id.
113. See, e.g., H.R. 8370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) which would amend § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976), to read "Any person injured in fact in his business or property as a
direct or indirect purchaser or seller or otherwise by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." H.R. 8370,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (amendment in italics). The Bill would also make the same
changes in the Parens Patriae provision, § 4A of the Clayton Act. Id. See Pub. L. No.
94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 15c(a)(1) (1976)); notes 15-17 and
accompanying text infra.
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